Differential phase shift quantum key distribution experiment over 105 km
  fibre by Takesue, H. et al.
1 
Differential phase shift quantum key distribution 
experiment over 105 km fibre 
H. Takesue1*, E. Diamanti2*, T. Honjo1, C. Langrock2, M. M. Fejer2, K. Inoue1, & Y. 
Yamamoto1,2 
1. NTT Basic Research Laboratories, NTT Corporation, 3-1 Morinosato Wakamiya, 
Atsugi, Kanagawa, Japan.  
2. E. L. Ginzton Laboratory, Stanford University, 450 Via Palou, Stanford, CA94305-
4088, USA. 
* These authors contributed equally to this work. 
Since several theoretical papers appeared in 20001,2, the quantum key distribution 
(QKD) community has been well aware that photon number splitting (PNS) attack 
by Eve severely limits the secure key distribution distance in BB843 QKD systems 
with Poissonian photon sources. In attempts to solve this problem, entanglement-
based QKD4-8, single-photon based QKD9,10, and entanglement swapping-based 
QKD11, have been studied in recent years. However, there are many technological 
difficulties that must be overcome before these schemes can become practical 
systems. Here we report a very simple QKD system, in which secure keys were 
generated over >100 km fibre for the first time. We used an alternative protocol of 
differential phase shift keying (DPSK)12 but with a Poissonian source. We analysed 
the security of the DPSK protocol and showed that it is robust against hybrid 
attacks including collective PNS attack over consecutive pulses, intercept-and-
resend (I-R) attack and beamsplitting (BS) attack, because of the non-deterministic 
collapse of a wavefunction in a quantum measurement.  
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Although there have already been many fibre-based BB84 QKD experiments that 
have used Poissonian photon sources 13-20, only a few have been able to produce keys 
that are secure against Eve’s PNS attack. The secure key generation rate of such 
systems scales with the square of the system transmittance, which means that long-
distance secure key distribution is very difficult when using the BB84 protocol with 
Poissonian sources. Recently, Gobby et al. reported a secure BB84 QKD experiment 
over 50 km that used InGaAs APDs with a very small dark count rate20, but with an 
extremely small secure key generation rate of about 0.1 bit/s. Recent studies show that 
the secure key distribution distance of the BB84 protocol with Poissonian sources can 
be significantly extended by implementing decoy states21-23. Although this scheme 
seems promising, experimental realization is still in an early stage with a reported 
distance of 15 km24. The use of a single photon source can significantly increase the 
secure key generation rate and distribution distance9,10, however such a light source is 
not yet available for the 1.5 µm band. Entanglement-based QKD4-8 systems are more 
robust against a PNS attack than BB84, but the maximum key distribution distance is 
limited to 30 km8, mainly due to the difficulty involved in the generation and 
coincidence detection of an entangled photon pair in the 1.5 µm band. The use of 
quantum repeaters based on nested entanglement purification and swapping11 
constitutes another candidate for long-distance quantum communication. However, to 
realize such a system, we need to overcome a number of technological challenges: 
capturing entangled photon pairs in quantum memories either by the cavity QED 
technique25 or the electromagnetically induced transparency technique26,27, and storing 
qubits of information in quantum memories with a long coherence time of typically 1-
10 s.  
The DPSK protocol provides a simple system architecture and an effective 
solution to these problems. Figure 1 shows a diagram of a QKD system based on the 
DPSK protocol. Alice randomly modulates the phase of a weak coherent pulse train by 
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{0,π} for each pulse, and sends it to Bob with an average photon number of less than 
one per pulse. Bob measures the phase difference of each consecutive pulse with a 1-bit 
delay interferometer followed by two detectors placed at the interferometer output ports. 
Detector 1 (D1) clicks when the phase difference is 0 and detector 2 (D2) clicks when 
the phase difference is π. Because the average photon number per pulse is less than one, 
Bob observes clicks only occasionally and at a random time instance. Bob informs 
Alice of the time instances at which he observes clicks. From her modulation data, 
Alice knows which detector clicked in Bob's site. By designating D1 and D2 clicks as 0 
and 1, respectively, they can share an identical bit string.  
We now describe the security of the DPSK protocol. In BB84 QKD systems with 
Poissonian photon sources, Eve can obtain qubit information by undertaking a quantum 
nondemolition (QND) measurement of the photon number on each pulse and extracting 
one photon from a pulse containing multi-photons (PNS attack). She can also launch an 
I-R attack on some of the single-photon pulses and block the remaining single photon 
pulses. As the fibre loss increases, she can suppress more single-photon pulses. In order 
to overcome this hybrid attack by Eve, the average photon number per pulse must be 
reduced along with the fibre loss. As a result, the secure key generation rate scales with 
the square of the system transmittance. On the other hand, a PNS attack on each pulse is 
obviously useless for the DPSK protocol because information is encoded in the phase 
correlation between two consecutive pulses. An effective attack against the DPSK 
protocol is a PNS attack on two consecutive pulses, in which Eve undertakes a QND 
measurement of the total photon number in two consecutive pulses and extracts one 
photon when she observed two or more photons in two particular pulses. However, such 
an attack breaks the phase coherence between adjacent pulses and must induce bit errors 
with a probability of 1/4. Thus, a PNS attack on two consecutive pulses cannot be 
launched on the DPSK protocol without inducing bit errors, and so the number of bits 
that can be obtained by this attack is always limited by the system error rate. Eve can 
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reduce the error probability by increasing the number of pulses for the PNS attack, but 
the probability that Eve obtains the same information as Bob decreases. Therefore, this 
collective PNS attack is not effective for DPSK protocol, even though PNS attack 
against BB84 protocol with a Poissonian source is very powerful. 
Instead, Eve can obtain coherent copies of the quantum states of pulses by 
inserting a beam splitter in the transmission line. This coherent BS attack does not 
introduce any errors and cannot be distinguished from innocent fibre loss. Along with 
the BS attack, Eve can also undertake an I-R attack as long as the bit errors induced by 
the I-R attack are kept smaller than the innocent bit errors of the system. In the 
following, we discuss the security of the DPSK protocol against Eve’s hybrid BS and I-
R attack. Although we do not know whether this hybrid attack is the most optimal 
attack against DPSK protocol, this attack is more effective than the collective PNS 
attack on consecutive pulses that we mentioned above. A more general security analysis 
that is not based on specific attacks is published elsewhere.  
Eve replaces a lossy fibre with transmittance α and imperfect detectors with a 
quantum efficiency η with her lossless fibre and perfect detectors, and splits Alice’s 
transmitter output into two paths with a BS. One beam with an average photon number 
of µNαη is sent to Bob through her lossless fibre so that Bob does not notice her 
eavesdropping from a change in the count rate. Here, µ is the average photon number 
per pulse and N is the number of pulses in the coherence time of a source. The other 
beam with an average photon number of µN(1-αη) is stored in her quantum memory. 
After Bob announces the time instances at which he obtained clicks, Eve puts her 
photons into her interferometer. However, each photon in her N-slot wavefunction is 
detected completely randomly at one of N different time instances. The probability that 
she obtains the phase modulation data at a desired time instance is 2µ(1-αη). An 
increase in the probability by a factor of two stems from the fact that she can use an 
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interferometer equipped with an optical switch at the input side instead of a 50:50 BS: 
she turns it on only at the time instances at which she wants interferometry. Thus, for 
the total  sifted keys of nsif bits, Eve has full information on 2µ nsif (1-αη) bits. Note that 
the mutual information between Eve and Bob is independent of the system 
transmittance (including detector quantum efficiency) αη if αη << 1. Therefore, the 
mutual information between Eve and Bob can be made small by simply choosing small 
µ that is independent of αη  if αη << 1. Eve can also launch an I-R attack by taking 
advantage of the system’s innocent bit errors. Eve further splits some photons from the 
transmitted µNαη photons, and measures the phase differences with her interferometer, 
which is identical to Bob’s. She then sends a signal only at time instances at which she 
detects photons. For each intercepted photon, she resends a single photon, which is split 
into two time slots through an interferometer identical to Bob’s, in which the relative 
phase between the two time slots is modulated by 0 or π according to the measurement 
results. When this fake photon arrives at Bob’s site, he counts a photon possibly at three 
time instances. The ratio of the probabilities of detecting a photon at these time 
instances is 1:2:1, where the correct phase difference is obtained only for the second 
time instance. Consequently, a fake photon induces an error in the first and third time 
instances with a probability of 1/4. This means that Eve can attack 4ensif photons, where 
e represents the innocent bit error rate of the system. With these intercepted photons, 
Eve can obtain full information on 2ensif bits (when Bob observes a click for the resent 
photons at the second time instance), and no information on the remaining bits. To 
summarize the above argument, the collision probability between bits owned by Bob 
and Eve is expressed as1  
}2)1(21{
2
1 en
c
sif
p
−−−


=
αηµ
                           (1) 
Using the above equation, the compression factor of the privacy amplification τ1 is 
calculated using the following equation1. 
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Then, the secure key generation rate Rs after error correction and privacy amplification 
is calculated to be1 
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where f(e) characterizes the performance of the error correction algorithm. Rng is the 
sifted key generation rate per second given by 
)2/exp( dccng tffR µαηµαη −= .                      (4) 
Here, fc and td represent the clock frequency and the detector dead time. The factor 1/2 
in the exponent arises from the fact that the average number of photons per second that 
reach each detector is µαfc/2. In the following theoretical calculations, we assumed a bi-
directional error correction protocol. When we assume that the bit error rate e=0 and the 
transmittance α is small, Eq. (3) is reduced to 
)21( µµαη −≈ cs fR                                      (5) 
Equation (5) shows that the secure key generation rate scales linearly with the system 
transmittance α. This characteristic is identical to those of the coherent-state-based B92 
protocol with a strong reference pulse28 and a recently proposed protocol similar to 
DPSK29.  
Next we explain the up-conversion detector, which is shown schematically in Fig. 
2 (a)30. A 1560-nm photon is combined with a strong pump light whose wavelength is 
1319 nm, and injected into a PPLN waveguide. In the waveguide, a 715-nm photon is 
generated via the sum frequency generation (SFG) process. The internal conversion 
efficiency from a 1560-nm photon to a 715-nm photon exceeds 99 %. The overall 
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conversion efficiency, including input coupling loss, waveguide loss, and output 
coupling loss is estimated to be approximately 65 %. The following filters suppress the 
noise photons such as the residual pump and SHG of the pump light. The SFG photon is 
detected with a single photon counting module (SPCM) based on a Si APD, which has a 
high quantum efficiency (about 70 %) and a small dark count rate (about 50 Hz). The 
overall quantum efficiency, including reflection and coupling losses and the dark count 
of the up-conversion detector used in our QKD experiments, is plotted in Fig. 2 (b) as a 
function of pump power. While the peak quantum efficiency was as high as about 37 % 
with a coupled pump power of around 120 mW, the dark counts increased quadratically 
as we increased the pump power, which was mainly due to noise photons generated by 
spontaneous Raman scattering process inside the waveguide and the input fibre pigtail. 
The up-conversion detector for a QKD system can be operated in a non-gated 
mode, thanks to the low afterpulse probability of the SPCM. When we use non-gated 
mode detectors with a dead time td, the sifted key generation rate Rng of a DPSK-QKD 
system with equal probabilities of “0” and “π” modulation can be calculated as Eq. (4). 
With a small dead time and a large loss, as in our experiment, the exponential part of Eq. 
(4) is close to unity. Therefore, Rng increases with clock frequency fc, which is as large 
as 1 GHz in our experiment. This ability of non-gated mode operation of the up-
conversion detector resulted in a significant increase in the key rate in our experiment, 
as we describe below.  
We now describe experiments that we undertook using the set-up shown in Fig. 1. 
At Alice's site, a continuous light from an external cavity semiconductor laser was 
modulated into a pulse train with a 1-GHz clock frequency using a LiNbO3 intensity 
modulator. The pulse width was 100 ps. The phase of each pulse was then modulated by 
{0,π} with a LiNbO3 phase modulator. After appropriate attenuation, the pulse train was 
sent to Bob’s site through a fibre, where a 1-bit delay interferometer based on planar 
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lightwave circuit (PLC) technology31 was installed. The insertion loss of the 
interferometer was 2.5 dB, and the extinction ratio was >20 dB. The up-conversion 
detectors were connected to the two output ports of the interferometer. The dead time of 
the SPCMs was 50 ns. Each click at the photon counters was recorded using a time 
interval analyser (TIA). To avoid bit errors due to large dark counts introduced by the 
up-converter, we kept the pump power at a relatively low level. The average photon 
number per pulse µ was set at its optimum value for each transmittance α, which was 
calculated using Eq. (3), to maximize the secure key generation rate. The optimum µ 
was around 0.16 - 0.18, depending on α, η and the dark count rate. We measured the 
sifted key generation rate and bit error rate five times for each transmittance, and took 
the average value. We calculated the secure key generation rates of the experiments 
with Eq. (3) using the sifted key generation rates and bit error rates obtained in the 
experiments. Fibre transmission experiments were undertaken using fibre spools, with 
Alice and Bob located in the same room. Error rate was measured by directly comparing 
the yielded sifted keys of Alice and Bob.  
Figure 3 (a) and (b), respectively, show histograms of detected photons counted 
by D1 and D2 for a fixed modulation pattern after 20 km fibre transmission32. The 
tailing distribution observed in this figure was mostly due to detector timing jitter. To 
reduce the contribution of erroneous clicks caused by this broadening of the received 
signal, we applied time gating to the recorded data, which also reduces the effective 
dark counts per time gate. Figure 4 shows the secure key generation rate as a function of 
fibre length. Squares represent the secure key generation rate of fibre transmission, and 
x symbols show the experimental results simulating a fibre loss with an optical 
attenuator when we set the overall detector quantum efficiency and the time window at 
8.8 % (at pump powers of approximately 15 mW) and 0.6 ns, respectively. Under these 
operating conditions, the total dark count rate of the two detectors was 26 kHz. As for 
fibre spools, we used dispersion-sifted fibre in order to avoid pulse broadening due to 
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chromatic dispersion. The green line is the theoretical prediction for a secure key 
generation rate at those quantum efficiency and dark count values, where µ is optimised 
to maximize the secure key generation rate at each fibre loss. This theoretical curve fits 
very well with the experimental result. The sifted key generation rates at corresponding 
fibre lengths are indicated by diamonds in Fig. 4. At fibre lengths of 30 km or less, we 
achieved a sifted key generation rate of more than 1 Mbit/s, which is two orders of 
magnitude larger than the previous record18. The secure key generation rate was 0.455 
Mbit/s over 20 km of optical fibre. Thus, even with the moderate 8.8 % quantum 
efficiencies, the key rate increased significantly, thanks to the non-gated mode operation 
of our up-conversion detectors. We then set the pump powers, the quantum efficiency, 
dark count, and time window width at approximately 3 mW, 2.0 %, 2.7 kHz and 0.2 ns, 
respectively, to further reduce the errors caused by dark counts. The experimental 
results are shown by a circle (105-km fibre transmission) and + symbols (attenuator), 
while the blue line is the theoretical calculation. By using the above detection set-up, 
secure key yielded with a rate of 209 bit/s. The bit error rate at 105 km was 7.95 %. The 
sources of errors are estimated as follows: 1 % is due to 20-dB extinction ratio of PLC 
interferometer, 5.5 % is from detector dark counts, and the rest is due to timing jitter. 
The triangles and red line show the experimental and theoretical secure key generation 
rates when we assumed a BB84 protocol with a Poissonian photon source and recently 
developed InGaAs photon counters20. It is clear that our result significantly outperforms 
a QKD system based on the BB84 protocol, both as regards secure key generation rate 
and distance. We also calculated the secure key distribution distance of a BB84 QKD 
system with a Poissonian source combined with our up-conversion detectors operated in 
the same condition as in our 105 km transmission experiment (i.e. 2.0-% quantum 
efficiency, 1.35-kHz dark count rate per detector, and 0.2-ns time window), using 
theory described in Ref. 2. As a result, the secure key distribution distance is at most 58 
km over fibre with 0.2 dB/km loss even when we can eliminate all the optical loss 
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except fibre. This clearly shows that the use of the DPSK protocol was essential for 
enlarging secure key distribution distance up to 105 km.  
In our experiment, the secure key distribution distance was limited by two 
impairments of the up-conversion detectors: a large dark count rate resulting from noise 
photons generated in the waveguide, and the large timing jitter of the SPCM33. If we can 
eliminate the noise photons34 and make the timing jitter negligibly small compared with 
pulse width, the secure key distribution distance will reach 300 km. Therefore, the 
development of entanglement-based quantum repeater systems would be meaningful 
only when the system length can exceed 300 km.  
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Figure 1: Schematic diagram of DPSK-QKD. IM: intensity modulator, PM: phase 
modulator, ATT: optical attenuator, PLC: planar lightwave circuit, D1, D2: 
detectors, TIA: time interval analyser.  
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Figure 2: (a) Schematic diagram of up-conversion detector. (b) Quantum 
efficiency and dark count rate as functions of pump power.  
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Figure 3: Histograms of the received signal at (a) D1 and (b) D2 for a fixed 
modulation pattern. 
18 
 
Figure 4: Secure key generation rate as a function of length of fibre with 0.2 
dB/km loss. Squares: fibre transmission (experiment, η =8.8 %), x: simulated 
points with attenuator (experiment, η =8.8 %). Circle: fibre transmission 
(experiment, η =2.0 %). +: simulated points with attenuator (experiment, η 
=2.0 %). Triangles: fibre transmission with BB84 and InGaAs APD (experiment 
described in 19). Green line: DPSK and up-conversion detector operated at η 
=8.8 % (theory). Blue line: DPSK and up-conversion detector operated at η 
=2.0 % (theory). Red line: BB84 and InGaAs APD (theory). 3 % system error is 
assumed. The characteristic of InGaAs APD is based on 19. Diamonds show the 
experimental data for sifted key generation rates at corresponding fiber lengths. 
Solid and dotted black lines shows the theoretical prediction of sifted key 
generation rates for η=8.8 and 2 %, respectively.  
  
